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SIGLER- BRIEF IN SUPPORT
I.

A.

Appeal from jury verdicts in district court: appeal

denial ofIdaho Criminal Rule 35

Request for Reconsideration of Sentence.
B. Procedural Historv
The appellant was charged with eight felony counts, indicted by the grand jury on C01mt I.,
POSSESSION OF SEXUALLY EXPLOITATIVE MATERIAL, FELONY, Counts 11.- VII.,
SEXUAL BATTERY OF A MINOR CHILD SLXTEEN OR SEVENTEEN YEARS OF AGE,
FELONY, (SIX C01.JNTS), and VIII. PROCUREMENT, FELONY, and entered pleas of "not
guilty" in district court. The district court presided over the four day jury trial. The jury found
the appellant "guilty" on Count 1. 1 and Count II?, "not guilty" on nvo counts, and deadlocked on
the remaining four counts.

state declined to pursue the four counts on which the jury was

unable to reach a verdict. A PSI and psychosexual evaluation were prepared. At the time of
sentencing, the Court imposed a 5 & 5 (10) on Count I, a concurrentlO &10 (20) on Count II,
imposed a $5,000 fine, and retained jurisdiction. At the end of the retained jurisdiction, the
Court placed the appellant on probation for a period of 20 years. A timely Notice of Appeal was
filed. Thereafter, a timely Idaho Criminal Rule, (hereafter "ICR"), 35 Motion to reduce sentence
was filed, briefed, and denied by the district court. The Notice of Appeal was amended to
include the denial of the ICR 35 Motion. This brief follows in support follows.

Possession of pictures depicting BC in various states of dress.
2 Sexual battery by making photographic recording, (sic), of a minor.
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C. Statement of Facts
The appellant was the OVvTIer &'1d

stock holder of a computer sales and service

company in Boise, Idaho. During the summer

2007, the appellant and one of his employees

were eating a local fast food restaurant and noticed that one of the vv-orkers, (the victim in this
case, hereafter "Be'), at the restaurant appeared to be a conscientious and fast worker. The
appellant gave the employee one of his business cards and suggested that she call about ajob at
his company. BC contacted the appellant the next day and was hired to scan a back log of
documents onto an electronic backup storage system, and assist other employees of the company
when needed.
BC purchased a digital camera from a local retail store, and took the camera to work. Be
used this camera to take pictures of various employees, and requested that the employees take
pictures of her. BC requested that the appellant take pictures of her to show to her boyfriend, the
appellant acquiesced, and pictures were taken for this purpose on two occasions. After
appellant took these pictures, he returned the camera to Be, and Be transferred the pictures by
way of a digital camera card to her company issued computer that is connected to the company
back-up system.
Be became pregnant while working at the company, and the appellant was not the father of
the child. Be stole approximately three thousand dollars from the company safe, was
confronted by the appellant, and returned a portion of the money. Be used a company credit to
make unauthorized purchases, was confronted, and acknowledged these thefts. BC stole a
laptop computer from the company, surreptitiously returned the computer after being questioned
by the appellant, and then admitted to the theft after being confronted with a surveillance video
that revealed her returning the computer. Be was fired as a result of the computer theft. After
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being terminated, BC returned to the business on a regular to
child. During

time period, BC 'vvas paid to

the

employees her new born
in the ne,v facility where the

business had moved.

II.

ISSCES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Was the appellant denied a fair trial by the state's frequent and ongoing violations of the rules
of evidence evenmally reaching the level of pro secutori al misconduct?
2. Did the District Court err

not granting the appellant's motion for a mistrial?

3. Did the District Court err in not granting the appellant's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to ICR
29?
4. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by not reducing the appellant's sentence on Count II
pursuant to ICR 35?
III. ARGUMENT

A. The appellant was denied a fair trial bv the state's frequent and ongoing violations of the rules
of evidence which eventuallv reached the level of prosecutorial misconduct.
The appellant made one hundred and fifteen (115) objections 3 during the state's
presentation of evidence and cross examination, eighty-one, (81), of the objections were
sustained,4 and in approximately four (4) instances it was not possible to tell from the record
how the judge ruled. 5 When the district court did not rule on some of the objections, it

3 Appellant's approximation from review of the record, examining the Court Reporter's index of
words using "object", (p 112- 113), "objections", (p 113), and "objects", (p 113). Appellant
further argues that the Court ruled erroneously on many of the objections that were over ruled.
Eg.: Appellant objected to hearsay when state's witness Kristina Bowins informed the jury that
the "bartender at "Backstreet Billiards", (not called as a witness), told the witness, "That she had,
you know, basically taken some money out of the till and he found out. And in return for not
turning her in to the police, there were sexual favors done.", (JT Tr p 278 through p 281). These
statements constitute hearsay, are highly prejudicial in that the only testimony presented by the
state that the appellant and BC had sex was from Be.
4 See Footnote 3, (supra).
5 In contrast, the state made twenty-three, (23), objections, with nine, (9), being sustained.
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admonished the prosecutors, and/or instmcted said prosecutors on

to properly introduce the

evidence to the jury.
the mling in State v Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010),6 a defendant in a criminal case has
the added burden of making a contemporaneous objection to every potential evidentiary' error
made by the state at jury trial or the issue is not preserved for review unless said error meets the
criteria as set out in Perry, (supra). Appellant argues that ajury could perceive counsel's
objections as attempts to keep harmfitl information from the jury' or delay the process. Juries are
not and cannot be privy to the rationale behind the Court's mlings and could \vrongly speculate
as to why the Court mled the way it did. The jury instmction addressing mlings and speculation
about said mlings is not sufficient in a case like this where the trial lasts four days and there are
over one hundred objections by the appellant.
At some point, the state's incompetence in attempting to present evidence violates a
defendant's right to due process and a fair triaL

state has an affirmative duty to do justice by

presenting their case in a manner that does not force the appellant to make endless and repetitive
objections.
The judge's role is that of neutral arbiter and it violates the appellant's right to due process
and arguably assists the state in presenting their case when the judge instructs the state on how to
introduce evidence and elicit testimony from a witness without violating the rules of evidence.

6 In State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010), the Idaho Supreme Court clarified the
fundamental error doctrine as it applies to allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. If the alleged
misconduct was not followed by a contemporaneous objection, an appellate court should reverse
when the defendant persuades the court that the alleged error: (1) violates one or more ofthe
defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) is clear or obvious without the need for reference
to any additional information not contained in the appellate record; and (3) affected the outcome
of the trial proceedings.ld. at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.
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During direct examination of a state's v,'imess, the Court sustains an obj ection, admonishes
the prosecutor to "ask open-ended, not leading questions.

ahead.", at

the

prosecutor asks for guidance, and Court has to further instruct "You should ask him \vhat he
knows about that. I am not going to tell you hov,' to conduct your examination. Counsel. I am
saying the question as I heard it to this witness was leading.",

I rial transcript (hereafter

"JI Ir') p 459, 11 5-25). Ihe transcript is rife with examples of the Court instructing the state
how to present their case. 7
Once again, these repeated and ongoing actions by the state eventually reach the level of
prosecutorial misconduct. State v Grantham, 146 Idaho 390, (2008), holds as follows:

"\Vhile our system of criminal justice is adversarial in nature, and the prosecutor is
expected to be diligent and leave no stone untumed, he is nevertheless expected and required
to be fair. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571,165 P.Jd 273, 285 (2007). Hovvever, in
reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct we must keep in mind the realities of trial.
Id. A fair trial is not necessarily a perfect trial. Id. When there is no contemporaneous
objection, a conviction will be reversed for prosecutorial misconduct only if the conduct is
sufficiently egregious so as to result in fundamental error. Jd. Fundamental error is an error
that goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights. See State v. Christiansen, 144
Idaho 463, 470, 163 P.3d 1175, 1182 (2007). However, even when prosecutorial misconduct
has resulted in fundamental error, the conviction will not be reversed when that error is
harmless. Field, 144 Idaho at 571, 165 P .3d at 285. Ihe test for whether prosecutorial
misconduct constitutes harmless error is whether the appellate court can conclude, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the result of the trial would not have been different absent the
misconduct. State v. Pecor, 132 Idaho 359, 368, 972 P.2d 737, 746 (Ct.App.1998)."
In the present case, the jury acquitted on two felonies, hung on four, and found the appellant
guilty on two. This incessant and ongoing misconduct by the state cannot be seen as harmless

State's witness Kelly Johnson attempts to tell the jury something that BC told the appellant, an
objection was made and sustained, the prosecutor then improperly argues in front of the jury, the
Court is forced to explain the elementary concept of hearsay and re-affirm its ruling, the
prosecutor makes an improper offer of proof in front of the jury, and the Court again re-affirms
its ruling, OT Tr p 592, 11 2-22). (Appellant did not count the two subsequent re-affirmations in
the totals in Footnote 3).
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enor.
The appellant reiterates all arguments in Issues 2 and 3 in support of this issue.

The District Court ened bv not 2:rantin2: the appellant's motion for a mistrial.
During the investigation.
wearing lingerie and

enforcement officers found pictures of the appellant's wife

various states of dress on computers seized from the company. The

state wanted to introduce these pictures to show that certain witnesses saw these pictures at the
same time said witnesses saw the pictures ofBC- essentially for purposes of establishing time
frames of reference. The appellant objected, and the Court ruled that the witnesses could testifY
about the pictures for purposes of establishing time frames, but no testimony about the
appellant's \\ife being nude in the photographs, (JT Tr p 431, 11 9-20). The prosecutor stated
that subsequent witnesses would be admonished about the Court's ruling, (JT Tr p 432, 111418).
The appellate review criteria for granting a mistrial is stated in State v Grantham, (supra), at
page 498, which states the applicable considerations:
"[TJhe question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably exercised his
discretion in light of circumstances existing when the mistrial motion was made. Rather, the
question must be whether the event which precipitated the motion for mistrial represented
reversible enor when viewed in the context of the full record. Thus, where a motion for
mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the "abuse of discretion" standard is a misnomer.
The standard, more accurately stated, is one of reversible enor. Our focus is upon the
continuing impact on the trial of the incident that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial
judge's refusal to declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed
retrospectively, constituted reversible enor."
The prosecutor asked state's witness Todd Vandehey, "Okay, And when you were in his
office, what photographs do you remember Mr. Sigler showing you?", to which Mr. Vandehey
responded, "Photographs of his wife in a negligee"., (JT Tr p 517, 11 11-14). The appellant
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objected, the Court sustained
matter outside

objection, at which time the appellant requested to take up a

the jury's presence.

The appellant then requested a mistrial,

TRp 519, 11

The state then established

that the prosecutor had discussed the issue of mentioning compromising photographs of the
appellant's \vife with Vandehey, but he, "misunderstood the negligee", (JT Tr p 520, 11 13).
The first reason the Court should have granted the mistrial is that this evidence of the
appellant showing pictures of his \vife to other males is highly prejudicial, particularly in light of
the fact appellant was charged with showing pictures of an underage female to other males. The
logical conclusion the jury would draw is that if the appellant would violate his wife's trust and
privacy, he would also violate the law. It is telling that the two counts on which the jury found
the appellant guilty involved showing pictures to others. This factor alone is suffIcient to grant a
mistrial under the reversible error analysis in Grantham, (supra).
The second reason the Court should have granted a mistrial is

state had a duty to

make the Court's ruling clear to its witnesses; this ruling does not involve difficult concepts.
The prosecutor went so far as to ask the Court for permission to lead the witness in order to
abide by the Court's ruling, (JT Tr p528, 1115-23). The state did not lay the proper foundation
for the use ofleading questions as the 'witnesses were adults, not hostile to the state, and of
above average intelligence. The Court has discretion under Idaho Rule of Evidence, (hereafter
"IRE"), 611 (c), but this was clearly abuse of that discretion. Permission should not have been
granted by the Court. 8

Appellant's attorney acquiesced to the use ofleading questions, but it is important to note that
the judge had already ruled leading questions would be allowed, (1T Tr p 528, 11 15-19).
Appellant fmiher argues that it obvious from the record up to this point that opposing the use of
leading questions on this issue could lead to more immediate problems as the state had not been
APPELLANT'S BRIEF Page 9 of 16
8

The third reason the Court should have granted a mistrial is that this error was compounded
due to the fact that this witness had never seen the pictures that

testified about, ((JT

p 522,

111-5: p 523,1110-25 through p 524, 11 1-18). This witness "vas not competent to testify about
these pictures, and in addition, the state should have known before asking the question he had
never seen them.
The issues in this case are similar to the issues in State v A1cAfurry, 143 Idaho 312, 143 P.3d
400 (Ct of App. 2006). In ,\;fcMuny, the prosecutor improperly conunented in closing how the
state's evidence had been un-rebutted when the defenda..l1t was the only person that could have
re-butted said evidence. Two common factors in the present case are: 1- That there was a
mistake by the prosecutor, (not properly instructing the \vitnesses concerning the judge's order,
asking a question that the prosecutor should have known would elicit the answer received, and
asking the question of an incompetent witness); and 2- The result of this mistake was the
violation of "specific ruling", (JT Tr p 524, 11

the Court that was highly prejudicial to the

appellant to the point the Court decided not to give a curative instruction as it would call more
attention to the issue, (JT Tr p 528, 114-6).
The appellant reiterates all arguments in this Issue 1 and 3 in support of this issue.

C. The District Court erred in not grantin!l the appellant's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to ICR
29.
At the close of the state's evidence, the appellants made an ICR 29 Motion to dismiss in the
form of a brief and by oral motion, (JT Tr p 1042 through plOSS).
State v Printz, 115 Idaho 566, 768 P.2d 829 (Id App. 1989), lists the criteria for ICR 29:

"Under LC.R. 29(a), a judgment of acquittal shall be entered if the evidence is
able to properly place evidence before the jury without "guidance" from the appellant by way of
objections and "advice" from the Court when sustaining said objections.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF Page lOaf 16

insufficient to sustain a conviction of the offense charged. Review of a denial of a motion for
judgment of acquittal requires the appellate court to independently consider the evidence in the
record and determine 'whether a reasonable mind would conclude that the defendant's guilt as to
each material element of the offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Envin,
Idaho 6, _ P
(1977). In making this determination, all reasonable inferences are taken
v. O/Campo,
P
5 (Ct.App.1982)."
Appellant will address Counts I and II sequentially.
Count I
Count I in the Indictment cites Idaho Code, (hereafter "IC"), sections 18-1507 and
1507A, with the language of, "posing in a sexually provocative manner, and exposing her bare
breasts". IC 18-1507A defines the conduct as knowingly and willfully having possession of any
sexually exploitative material as defined in IC 18-1507. The definition of "sexually exploitative
material" in IC 18-1507(2)(k) is as follows: "Sexually exploitative material" means any
photograph, ... or other electronically, ... reproduced visual material which depicts a child
participating in, observing, or being used for explicit sexual conduct." "Explicit sexual conduct"
is defined in IC 18-1507(2)(f): "means sexual intercourse, erotic fondling, erotic nudity,
masturbation, sadomasochism, sexual excitement, or bestiality."
BC purchased the camera and took it to work. Be's testimony was that she had informed
the appellant she was in need of money, and the appellant offered to take pictures, (JT Tr p 735,
1113-21). The state's case failed as to Count I in that none of the factors under IC 18-1507(2)(f)
were proven or established by the state. There was no evidence of sexual intercourse; the only
evidence of sexual touching was the consensual oral genital contact that occurred after BC was
eighteen years of age. There was no evidence or testimony about erotic fondling associated with
Count I, possession of exploitative material. There was no evidence of masturbation,
sadomasochism, sexual excitement, or bestiality.
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only remaining disjunctive

listed under IC 18-1507(2)(f) is erotic nudity.

I should not have been

nudity is defined in State

140 Idaho 235, 91 P.3d, 1139
is defined. in relevant part, to mean the display of the human male or
female genitals or pubic area, the undeveloped or developing genitals or pubic area of the human
male or female child, the human female breasts, or the undeveloped or developing breast area of
the human female child, for the purpose of real or simulated overt sexual gratification or
stimulation of one or more of the persons involved. I.C. § 18-1507(2)(e). The policy rationale
behind the enactment ofthis statute is to "protect children from the physical and psychological
damage caused by their being used in photographic representations of sexual conduct which
involves children." I.c. § lS-1507A(l)."
The testimony from BC was that appellant told her what to do and how to pose when
taking the pictures. If the jury deemed this testimony to be credible, the elements of erotic nudity
are not present. There was absolutely no evidence or testimony that these pictures were taken or
utilized to arouse, stimulate, or sexually gratify BC or the appellant.
Count II
IC lS-1508A reads as follows pertinent part:
"1) It is a felony for any person at least five (5) years of age older than a minor child who is
sixteen (16) or seventeen (17) years of age, who, with the intent of arousing, appealing to or
gratifying the lust, passion, or sexual desires of such person, minor child, or third party, to:
(d) Make any photographic or electronic recording of such minor child."
The charging language in the Indictment reads in pertinent part, " ... did commit Sexual
Battery by making photographic recording, (sic), of a minor, B.C., of the age of sixteen or
seventeen years, with the intent to gratify the sexual desire of the defendant, ... "
Once again, Count II should not have gone to the jury as the state presented absolutely no
evidence that these pictures were taken to arouse, appeal to, or gratify the lust or passion of the
appellant, BC, or anyone else.
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The appellant reiterates

arguments in Issues 1 and 2 in support

this issue.

D. The District Court abused its discretion bv not reducinQ the appellant's sentence on Count II
pursuant to ICR 35.
The appellant requests this Court to review the Al\'fENDED
SUPPORT OF I.c.R. 35

attachments), filed

IN

District Court on August 16,2012,

and made part of the record in this case in the MOTION TO AUGMENT filed on September 7,
2012.
The case law and criteria for a reduction of sentence pursuant to ICR 35 is well settled
and voluminous, as is the criteria for review of a denial by the appellate court, so appellant is
citing the only case discovered \vhere an abuse of discretion \vas found, State v Carrasco, 114
Idaho 348,757 P.2d, 211 (CtApp. 190), where the court held:
also contends that, under the circumstances, the judge abused his discretion by
pronouncing a thirty-year indetenninate sentence and by declining to reduce the sentence when
requested to do so pursuant to LC.R. 35. Both the length of a sentence and the decision whether
to reduce a sentence rest in the sound discretion of the sentencing court. See State v. Lopez, 106
Idaho 447,
P.2d
(Ct.App.1984); State v. Toohill. 103
565,650 P.2d 707
(Ct.App.1982).
could have been sentenced to a maximum tenn of life in prison for
delivery of these substances. I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1)(A). Absent a clear abuse of discretion, a
sentence or a decision to deny reduction will not be disturbed if the sentence imposed is within
the maximum period allowed by statute as punishment for the particular crime. State v. Araiza,
109 Idaho 188, 706 P .2d 77 (Ct.App.1985); State v. Toohill, supra. Our scope of review includes
all infonnation submitted at the original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on
the motion to reduce. State v. Araiza, supra.
Wilen reviewing indetenninate sentences, absent a contrary indication, we deem the length
of confinement to be one-third of the face amount of the sentence.
[757 P.2d 215J [114 Idaho 352] See State v. Toohill, supra. Therefore, for purposes of appellate
review the length of confinement in the instant case is treated as ten years. In T oohill, we
explained that a term of confinement is reasonable to the extent it appears necessary at the time
of sentencing to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all
of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution. A sentence longer than necessary
for these purposes is unreasonable and may represent a clear abuse of discretion. Id. These
criteria also apply to rulings on motions to reduce sentences under Rule 35. State v. Lopez,
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supra.
The appellant in this case was placed on probation after a retained jurisdiction as opposed
to imposition of the sentence at the time of sentencing in Carrasco, (supra), but the facts of the
case and the reasoning of the Carrasco court are somewhat comparable.
The appellant had an absolutely clean record prior to these convictions. The two counts
which he was convicted did not involve any physical touching ofBC. The Court of Appeals
in Carrasco noted that the defendant brought 1\\'0 pounds of heroin and two pounds of cocaine
into the community around Rexberg, Idaho. These amounts of these two dangerous and
addictive drugs could have had a devastating effect on this somewhat serene and peaceable
region of the state, but the Court still reduced the sentence form thirty years to twenty years under
the criteria in ICR 35. In the present case, the appellant's actions had a devastating impact on
BC, but the conduct for which he was convicted does not warrant a twenty year probationary
period.
The appellant contends the sentence pronounced by the District Court was an abuse of
discretion, as was the denial of the ICR 35.
State v j\1artinez, 113 Idaho 535, 746 P.2d 994 (1987) holds as follows:
"An LC.R. 35 motion to reduce sentence is essentially a plea for leniency, and a decision
thereon is vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing court, State v. Arambula, 97 Idaho
627,550 P.2d 130 (1976), and the motion may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was
for any reason unduly severe. State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 680 P .2d 869 (CLApp.l984); State
v. Sutton, 106 Idaho .:+03,679 P.2d 680 (Ct.App.1984). An LC.R. 35 motion places on the
movant the burden of showing that the original sentence was unduly severe. On appeal the
appellant also bears the burden of presenting a sufficient record to evaluate the merits of the
challenge of a discretionary decision related to sentencing. State v. Wolf, 102 Idaho 789, 640 P .2d
1190 (Ct.App.1982). See also State v. Dusenbery, 109 Idaho 730, 710 P.2d 640 (Ct.App.l985)."
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The District Court made some disturbing statements during the pronouncement of the
sentence. The Court noted that "there is
not based upon

the

a temptation, I think, to sentence a defendant
guilty

vvhat the defendant has been

charged \vith.". (Sentencing Hearing transcript that has been placed in appellant's materials after
the jury trial transcript so a jury trial citation

be used, (JT Tr p 1338,11 5-9).

appellant

argues that the District Judge proceeded to sentence the appellant taking into consideration the
dismissed charges. The Court pointed out that the defendant was not acquitted on four of the
felonies; the jury \vas unable to reach a verdict, (IT Tr p 1338,1110-16). Appellant argues that
the Court can only sentence a defendant for the crimes he \X/as found guilty, crimes that the jury
hung on and that were ultimately dismissed are of no consequence and should not have been
mentioned by the Court.
The Court further improperly speculates about theses dismissed charges as evidenced by
the anecdotal conjectures concerning other cases with hung juries to the point of essentially
determining that there was a 70 to 80 percent chance the appellant would be found guilty at a
subsequent trial, (JT Tr p 1338, II 10-24). Once again, the dismissed charges should not have
been considered in any way by the Court. The Court goes on to hypothesize about the dismissed
charges once again and states, "Obviously, some were in favor of finding the defendant guilty,
and some were in favor of acquitting the defendant and they could not reach an agreement. .. So
we don't know whether they were closer to acquittal of they were closer to guilty.", (IT Tr p
1342,1121-25, through p 1343,111-7). The Court's decision to sentence the appellant to twenty
years was definitely influenced by the speculation about the four Counts upon which the jury
hung.
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CONCLUSION

F or the reasons set forth in this

and based on all materials in the case file, the appellant

requests this Court to vacate the Judgments

Conviction and remand this case for a new

In the alternative, the appellant requests this Court to find that the District Court abused its
discretion in not granting the appellant's ICR 35 and reduce Count II to a aggregate ten year
sentence of five years plus five years, concurrent with Count 1.

DATED This

~ day Of~ , 2012. ~_ __
/------;L~
DAVID 1. 3tiETHERS
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY, That on this ~ day of November, 2012, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to the following by the method indicated
below:

ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
[ .. ] United States Mail, First Class, Postage Prepaid
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